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Defence reforms in general and building of new military capability in particular affect the
national defence environment as much as these exogenous variables affect it. A combination of
government economic policies, reduced defence budget ceilings, the projected further decline
in defence expenditures and escalating manpower and equipment costs serve to put severe
constraints on what armed forces can and can not do in the future. Armed forces depend on
the government and parliament to decide what annual amount of money they are to receive
from the public purse. The government s approach to the question of how much to spend on
defence is a time tested one. Beside the total amount per year which state can reasonably
afford for defence, there is another principal issue where levels of defence expenditures are
concerned. The broad alternatives of SEE countries to downward pressures on defence expen-
ditures are clear: either "drown down" the number of defence and security commitments or
finding ways of achieving more by ways of operational effectiveness with progressively less
money and fewer resources.
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1. Introduction
The defence reforms do not take place in a
vacuum. As results of defence reform new national
defence policy, military doctrine, force design and
equipment combine to create a new military capa-
bility. This is, however, contingent of the availabil-
ity of four variables: manpower, economic resources,
weapons availability, and organisation, which are in
turn affected by external influences, both domestic
and international. However this process of causality
is not one way. Defence reforms in general and build-
ing of new military capability in particular affect the
national defence environment as much as these ex-
ogenous variables affect it.
One of the major external variables influenc-
ing defence reforms is national resources. Although
usually poor economic performance, which leads to
budgetary restrains, is a condition to undertake sub-
stantial defence reform, because they create the nec-
essary pressure on armed forces to evaluate the whole
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structure, we can say that on the other hand they are
limiting factors in defence planning of substantial
defence reforms, which are expensive. A combina-
tion of government economic policies, reduced de-
fence budget ceilings, the projected further decline
in defence expenditures and escalating manpower
and equipment costs serveto put severe constraints
on what armed forces can and can not do in the fu-
ture.
2. The Problem of Economics
Most people understand the problem of eco-
nomics as being the question of availability of na-
tional resources that make the achievement of the
given public objectives possible. It is an issue of
scarce resources and excessive needs. Usually armed
forces depend on the government and parliament to
decide what annual amount of money they are to re-
ceive from the public purse. Two basic considera-
tions arise from this predicament: (1) one is the gross
amount they receive in one year and (2) the other is
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Table 1: Economic Performance in SEE Countries in 2000
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the manner in which the Ministry of Defence man-
ages and allocates that amount between the services,
salaries of personnel, operations and weapons ac-
quisition, research and development.
The government's approach to the question of
how much to spend on defence is a time tested one.
Essentially, it has been to peg defence expenditures
annually at a certain figure, assessed some two or
three years in advance. This figure is based on as-
sumptions about total levels of public expenditure,
growth in the economy, and politically acceptable
levels of defence expenditure expressed either as
percentages of the government budget or the Gross
Domestic Product. In other words, defence planners
have to operate within defined ceilings, working on
the assumption that they may not exceed that figure,
that funding will not necessarily be allowed to roll
forward from one year to the next, and that they have
to optimise the defence output with resources avail-
able.
The approach does not allow much flexibil-
ity, and contingencies have to be met from within
the existing budget, or from additional appropria-
tion from parliament. The problem is that the level
of defence expenditure in anyone year depends on
the government's ability to manage the national
economy effectively, a task over which it no longer
has absolute control. The management of the national
economy, even where the Ministry of Finance can
exercise some degree of control, is at best a juggling
act and at worst a matter of good faith. Assumptions
can go seriously wrong.
3. Economic Performance and
Defence expenditures
Unenviable economy situation in the major-
ity of the SEE countries (Table 1), both relatively
and absolutely did, and still do, bear directly on na-
tional defence systems, in a number of ways: (1) they
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bear on the level of national defence expenditure and
the resources available for the armed forces, and (2)
they are drivers behind public's perception of what
should be appropriate amount of taxpayers money
to be allocated to defence.
(l) As defence is a public good, which is en-
tirely funded from public purse, defence expendi-
tures bring us to the classic problem of "guns versus
butter", that is, the trade-off of defence goods against
non-defence goods. For the public official, the chal-
lenge is to optimise a fixed budget in such a way as
to produce the best mix of defence and non defence
goods, which would meet both the national security
and social welfare goals set by the government.
The common element of transition experience
of the SEE countries is disruption and economic dis-
tress (Table 1). In the beginning of 1990s output and
income fell everywhere. What is worse, in most SE
European countries the key macroeconomic indica-
tors did not regain late 1980s levels until second half
of 1990s and in same post conflict countries have
Table 3: Defence Expenditures in SE Europe States
still not done so. Thus the key indicator of individual
well-being - income per capita - has stood for years,
and still stands at alarming low levels. This is trou-
bling, because it accounts for widespread disappoint-
ment with democratisation, market economy and re-
form in general. The fight for better socio-economic
situation in the SEE countries not only influences
the level of defence expenditure, but also forces
Ministry of Defence, as one of major spending de-
partments, into direct competition with other gov-
ernment departments with expenditure obligations.
However, there is a fundamental difference
between the Ministry of Defence and other govern-
ment departments: the government does not usually
have any exact long-term statutory obligation to pro-
vide for defence of the nation, in contrast, the gov-
ernment is legally obligated to provide minimum
standards of health, education, social welfare, pen-
sions and other social benefits. Therefore the scope
for significant adjustment to the amounts that these
social obligations generate is limited in law. Above













Albania 1,4 48,3 47.000
Bosnia & Herzegovina" 5 227 40.000
Bulgaria 2,8 351 79.760
Croatia 4,2 922 61.000
Macedonia 2,5 89 16.000
Romania 1,6 660 207.000
Slovenia 1,4 282 9.000









• Calculated by SIPRI for latest year available 1999, except FRY 1998; SIPRI Yearbook, 2002.
b Calculated by SIPRI; data are in constant US$ based on constant 1998 prices, SIPRI Yearbook 2002.
c From IISS, The Military Balance, 1999-2000.
d Exclude Bosnian Serbs.
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politically sensitive, and ill judged. In other words,
the defence budget, especially in time of peace and
when there is no immediate military threat, is rela-
tively easy area in which to make cuts in support of
more immediate priority objective of holding down
levels of public expenditures.
(2) Further, defence is not an area of politics,
which normally attracts large public sympathy of
support, least of all when viewed in terms of civilian
opportunity costs. Concomitant with changed per-
ception of security has been a marked shift in public
attitude as to what constitutes an acceptable level of
public expenditure on the armed forces and military
security. There is clear appreciation of the extent of
the threat once posed to the SEE in contrast with
that posed today. The military landscape in SEE
countries over the last few years has manifestly
changed substantially and renders past levels of mil i-
tary preparedness and budgetary spending on defence
difficult to justify and for the most SEE countries
publicly unacceptable.
Moreover, as health, education, and welfare
demands continually put on pressure to rise the total
level of public expenditure, the government's re-
sponse is to look for reduction elsewhere. The pres-
sures to cash in "peace dividend" have also made
the defence budget in SEE countries an obvious and
ready target (Figure 1).
The only alternative way to break out of eco-
nomic constraints would appear to be to promote an
increase in the rate of national economic growth,
from which all areas of public spending can benefit,
defence included. In other words the best indication
of a defence budget's potential future growth is the
rate of GDP growth. If the state has sufficient ex-
tractive capacity, GDP growth generally allows for
growth in state expenditures. Thus, sustained high
GDP growth points to the potential for increased ex-
penditures on defence. The problem here is that al-
though the trends point to the feasibility of gradual
increases the GDP real growth in the past ten years
in the most SEE countries has not been good enough
to meet that objective (Table 2).
Apart from that the Ministries of Defence and
armed forces from SEE have found themselves in a
cleft stick: on the one hand the total amount of re-
sources has been declining, while, on the other, the
costs of modem weapons, equipment, manpower,
training etc. have been increasing at a faster rate.
Defence expenditures per solider provide a rough
measure ofthe technological sophistication of a coun-
try's armed forces. The technologically most ad-
vanced armed forces spend more then 100,000 US$
per solider. That means that the SEE countries would
have to rise their per-solider spending significantly
if they wanted to have technologically modem armed
forces (Table 3).
4. Conclusion
Thus we can conclude that economic con-
straints in SEE at list seriously limit the governments
and armed forces to promote defence reform as rap-
idly as they would like, if not even threat their reali-
zation.
Beside the total amount per year which state
can reasonably afford for defence, there is another
principal issue where levels of defence expenditures
are concerned. That is what to do with that amount,
once it has been appropriated. As total amounts de-
cline, so those charged with the responsibility for
planning defence have to try and do more with the
limited resources they have been given. At the same
time they must continue to meet the responsibilities
and objectives they have to fulfil. The only option
would be to reduce defence policy objectives.
The broad alternatives of SEE countries to
downward pressures on defence expenditures are
clear: either "drown down" the number of defence
and security commitments, overall reduction in force
levels, fewer man and equipment, called also defence
forces "down-sizing" or finding ways of achieving
more by ways of operational effectiveness with pro-
gressively less money and fewer resources.
